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TAX PREPARATION AGENCIES: WHAT IS NEEDED FOR
THE PUBLIC'S PROTECTION?
Each year, as April 15 approaches, taxpayers are inundated with
advertisements urging them to utilize various income tax preparation
services. So many taxpayers have heeded the advice that the companies
offering these services have proliferated into an expanding industry,
an expansion facilitated in part by advances in the computer industry.
Obviating the need for personnel thoroughly trained in law or accoun-
tancy,' these technological changes permit millions of tax returns to
be prepared by programming a computer to perform the appropriate
calculations and complete the required forms. Moreover, the fact that
neither the federal nor any of the state governments have set standards
of competency or responsibility for those engaged in the business, un-
less they are attorneys or public accountants, has also contributed to
the rapid increase in the number and variety of tax preparation com-
panies.2 H & R Block, for example, originated the tax preparation
service in 1954, when the IRS ceased preparing returns for taxpayers .°
Today that company operates over 5,000 offices and franchises in the
United States and Canada.4 It has been joined by a number of com-
petitors who offer one of three basic types of services: personal prep-
aration of the return in consultation with the taxpayer; computer
preparations of a return on the basis of data provided by a question-
naire prepared by the taxpayer; and hybrid services utilizing both
a client conference and subsequent submission of the data to a com-
puter.°
The growth of the industry has been accompanied by a growing
governmental concern regarding possible inequitable practices in the
solicitation of business and in the preparation of tax returns. Several
members of Congress have introduced legislation to regulate the com-
panies by requiring minimum standards of competence for the em-
ployees of these firms.° In addition, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has given notice of intention to file a complaint against H & R
Block and Beneficial Corporation for deceptive advertising practices
and misuse of confidential information. 7 This comment will examine
1 Illustrative of the fact that sophistication in tax matters is not required is the entry
of department stores into the industry—e.g., Sears, Roebuck, J.C. Penney, and Mont-
gomery Ward are in competition for tax return preparation clients. Taxes: Happier Re-
turns, Newsweek, Feb. 23, 1970, at 74 [hereinafter cited as Taxes: Happier Returns].
2 See 117 Cong. Rec. 54749 (daily ed. April 14, 1971) (remarks of Senator Ribicoff).
3 Originally, the brothers Bloch had operated a bookkeeping service in Kansas City,
preparing tax statements as a service to their regular customers. H & R Block provides
individualized service to each customer, and, by its own estimate, prepares ten percent
of the total tax returns in the country. Business Week, March 25, 1967, at 197.
4 Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at 25, col. 3.
5 Taxes: Happier Returns, supra note 1, at 79.
o Boston Globe, Oct. 11, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
7 Wall Street Journal, July 1, 1971, at 8, col. 1. The FTC has provisionally accepted
a consent order prohibiting H & R Block from making certain deceptive claims in adver-
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the issues raised by the proposed FTC complaint and the possible
improvements which can be made in the industry through enactment
of the proposed legislation.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INCOMPETENCE
Three recent surveys' indicate the extent of inaccuracy possible
in the commercial preparation of tax returns. In each of the investiga-
tions, identical sets of data were submitted to several firms which
prepared tax returns based on the information supplied. The results
were compared to measure discrepancies in preparation costs and to
evaluate the precision of the work performed. In one survey, corre-
spondents for Newsweek magazine presented to several firms the same
hypothetical data based on the income of a mythical taxpayer. When
the completed returns were collected, the figures showing tax due
varied over a range of $55 and the fee for the services ranged from
$9.50 to $22.°
In another survey, an Atlanta businessman; with the assistance of a
Wall Street Journal reporter, compared various tax services in northern
Georgia. The taxpayer provided each of five firms with his personal
tax information, including data regarding a reimbursement for moving
expenses." The investigation revealed that the preparation fees ranged
from $15 to $31, with an arithmetic mean of $24. More significant,
the standard deviation of the tax computations was $110 from the
mean. In other words, two-thirds of the returns showed results scat-
tered over a $220 range, deviating from the mean by as much as $110.
When one considers the precision with which tax returns should be
calculated, this difference constitutes an extremely wide discrepancy.
Understandably intrigued by these results, the Atlanta surveyist
sought the assistance of the Internal Revenue Service. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that the Service no longer prepares returns for taxpayers,
the agency agreed to make an exception in this instance because the
public would be served by the investigation and its publication. The
Service's tax figure was nearly equal to the mean of the amounts corn-
tising and utilizing client personal data without prior permission. FTC, News Summary
No. 1 (1972). The provisional acceptance of a cease and desist order by the FTC settles
a violation or claimed violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act . 	 with-
out a formal adjudicative hearing. 	 . [T]he decision whether or not this pro-
cedure will be utilized is made by the FTC and not a person or company charged
with violating the law. Although a formal adjudicative hearing is avoided, the
order to cease and desist entered under this procedure has the same force and
effect with respect to compliance as an order produced by trial. Civil penalties
may be imposed for the violation of such an order.
3 Trade Reg. Rep. 9595, at 17,096 (1971).
8 See Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at 1, col. 6; Edwards, The Urban Strategist:
Many Happy Returns, New York Magazine, March 15, 1971, at 62 [hereinafter cited as
Edwards]; and Taxes: Happier Returns, supra note 1.
9 Taxes: Happier Returns, supra note 1, at 79.
10 Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
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puted by the five companies." However, considering the high standard
deviation in the survey, it is submitted that the similarity between the
Service's figure and the mean in no way ameliorates the widespread
discrepancies revealed by the survey.
Moreover, the Georgia survey revealed a sizeable variation be-
tween two branches of the same company. The total tax due, as com-
puted by one office, 'exceeded that of the other by $55. 12 Their fees
also differed. This intracompany discrepancy was partly due to the
fact that the fees were set according to the number of Internal Reve-
nue Service forms utilized; one office had used an additional form. The
surveyists also attributed the deviation to clerical errors and to the
failure of one consultant to include a medical expense deduction."
Another survey was conducted by a self-employed New York City
writer who presented identical tax information to seven tax preparation
agencies in New York City.14 Of the seven firms, Beneficial, a com-
pany which utilizes a computer, declined to prepare the surveyist's
return because the computer was not equipped to handle the IRS form
for self-employed individuals. The remaining agencies surveyed quoted
fees ranging from $16 to $125, and two firms offered discounts when
the taxpayers appeared reluctant to pay the requested fee. The mean
for the preparation charges incurred in this survey was $23. 15 Returns
were prepared by four of the firms and their tax computations varied
over a range of $245, with a standard deviation of $96:
Other instances of incompetence were revealed in the Georgia and
New York surveys: one agency neglected to include a medical expense
deduction to which the taxpayer was entitled;" another failed to fill
in a form for social security assessments for the writer;" another
entered moving expenses under the travel and entertainment section
in order to spare the client the cost of the appropriate IRS form;"
and several firms did not allow for withheld taxes even though such
amounts were noted on the W-2 forms." Although the Georgia survey
did not reveal any fraud, one preparer mistakenly entered his com-
pany's fee for tax preparation as a deduction." When informed that
the taxpayer was not entitled to such a deduction because the pro-
11 It should be noted that the IRS is not free from error itself. Initially, the Service
said that the taxpayer was entitled to a refund of $446.10. Later, when the taxpayer
questioned the figure, the IRS agent indicated he had erred in the computation of moving
expenses. The correct refund was $400.94. Id. at 25, col. 3.
12 One branch of H & R Block stated that a refund of $487 was due, but another
said that the refund should be $542. Id. at 1, col. 6.
18 Id. at 25, col. 3.
14 Edwards, supra note 8, at 62.
15 The discounted fees were used in compiling this statistic.
10 Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at 25, col. 3.
17 Edwards, supra note 8, at 64.
18 Id. at 70.
10 Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at 25, col. 3.
20 Id. at 25, col. 4.
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fessional tax advice had not been utilized during the tax year, the
preparer attempted to excuse himself by stating that the entry had
been mistakenly made for the current year's fee. However, the figures
did not support this contention—the amount of the deduction taken
was $25, but the actual fee for the current service was $3 1.21 Although
this discrepancy of itself does not indicate fraudulent activity, it
clearly establishes incompetence and places clients in the unenviable
position of not knowing whether they are paying an excessive income
tax or the absolute minimum required by iaw.22
I.I. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
In an attempt to abate the industry's deficiencies as disclosed by
the surveys, Senator Abraham Ribicoff has introduced S. 1527, known
as the Taxpayer's Protection Act, 28 which would establish a standard
of competence for those who prepare tax returns. The proposed legis-
lation would provide for the licensing of those who prepare returns
for more than twenty-five taxpayers in a calendar year." Prior to
being granted a license, tax preparers would have to meet a predeter-
mined standard of competency and submit to a written examination
21 Id .
"Clients are generally in a position of total helplessness where professional services
in tax matters are concerned. . . . Has a disaster occurred because he must pay as much
as $10,000 in taxes? Or has he had such fine professional representation that he paid the
absolute minimum which the law demands—a mere $10,000?" Rembar, The Practice of
Taxes, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 339 (1954).
28 S. 1527, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
24 S. 1527, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. * 1(a) (1971) provides:
Any individual, engaged in the business of preparing returns . . . for others,
who meets the standards set . . . . by the Secretary . . . may hold himself as a
"United States licensed tax return preparer." An individual who prepares more
than 25 returns ... for others, in any calendar year, shall ... meet the standards
set . . . for designation as a "United States licensed tax return preparer."
A subsequently introduced amendment to S. 1527 would exempt attorneys, certified
public accountants and enrolled agents from the operation of the law. S. 1527 §1(a), 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Although Senator Ribicoff has introduced this exception for the traditional tax
professionals, the National Society of Public Accountants (NSPA) has proposed a registra-
tion procedure for any person who prepares tax returns for a fee. The NSPA proposal,
formulated in response to a request by the IRS for views on the regulation of tax pre-
parers, in substance provides that:
(1) Every person preparing a return for a fee would be compelled to
register with their respective local IRS district director. In addition, each
registrant would have to obtain a registration number which must appear on all
prepared returns.
(2) Preparing a return for a fee without a valid registration would be
punishable as a misdemeanor.
(3) The registration would be valid for a three-year period and renewable
upon a showing of continuing technical education in the field of federal taxation.
(4) In order to avoid an implication of government endorsement of
registrants, preparers would be prohibited from advertising their registration.
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given by the Treasury Department." In addition, the license would
be revoked if the licensee engaged in incompetent or unethical be-
havior." S. 1527 would also authorize the Treasury Department to
formulate such standards for preparers of returns as are necessary
for effecting the purposes of the Act. Since the effectiveness of the
standards to be promulgated by the IRS will determine the success
of the program, it is suggested that norms such as those commonly
applied to attorneys and public accountants engaged in tax practices
would provide a viable standard for nonprofessional tax return pre-
parers.
In the accounting profession, an accountant must exercise dili-
gence in handling the affairs of his client. 27 A public accountant is
under a duty to use the due care and caution proper to his calling
when employed to supply factual information to an employer, and he
must respond in damages if the employer detrimentally relies on the
information." In Bancroft v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North Amer-
ica,2° the liability insurer of a certified public accountant was held
liable for the latter's negligent advice in connection with a stock trans-
fer. Specifically, the accountant had advised the plaintiff that no tax
liability would be incurred if the plaintiff sold shares of stock to a
corporation in which the plaintiff was the principal stockholder. Act-
ing on the advice, the client engaged in two such transactions. Subse-
quently, a tax exceeding thirty-five thousand dollars was assessed
against the plaintiff. In an action to recover this amount from the
accountant's insurer, the court held that the insurance company was
liable for the loss and that the taxpayer was entitled to compensation
for the entire loss occasioned by his reliance on the unsound advice.
If a similar standard of diligence were imposed on nonprofessional
tax return preparers, low-income taxpayers, unable to afford high-
priced professional service, would also be protected against the hazard
inherent in relying on unsound tax advice. Thus such taxpayers would
be able to recover from the tax preparation agency any additional tax
liability incurred because of the agency's mistakes, rather than the
currently available relief, which is limited to the penalty or interest
the IRS levies on the taxpayer.
(5) The IRS would be empowered to suspend or revoke a preparer's
registration for cause. Grounds for suspension would include gross incompetence,
fraud, willful misconduct, unethical advertising and similar activities.
8 P-H 1972 Fed. Taxes ¶60,095.
25 Id. § 1(b).
26 Id. § 1(c).
27 Lindner v. Barlow, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 665, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (Dist. Ct.
1962).
28 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 229 A (1965). "If his pretensions are unfounded,
he commits a species of fraud upon every man who employs him in reliance on his public
profession." 3 Cooley, Torts § 472 (4th ed. 1932). See also Hawkins, Professional Negli-
gence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 797 (1959).
20 203 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. La. 1962), aff'd, 309 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Ill. FALSE OR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
In addition to addressing the issue of incompetence,' the federal
government has expressed concern regarding advertising practices in
the industry. In order to assuage their fear of errors in the compila-
tion of tax data and the ,completion of tax returns, many taxpayers
may rely on advertised representations and decide to utilize a tax
preparation service. All the firms investigated in the Georgia survey
promised to pay the penalty or interest assessed against the taxpayer
as a result of an error on the part of the agency. 8° Many of the firms
advertised these warranties extensively. However, in most cases the
advertisements are misleading in that taxpayers may be deceived re-
garding the extent to which the companies are actually bound.
In response to this situation,.the FTC gave notice of intention
to file a complaint against H & R Block for alleged deceptive adver-
tising practices 3 1 Among other representations, Block has advertised
•that "[w]e guarantee accurate preparation of every tax return. If
we make any errors which cost you penalty or interest, we will pay
that penalty or interest. That's the H & R Block guarantee.” 32 Words
to this effect consistently appear in that company's numerous adver-
tisements. The proposed FTC complaint claims that by this advertis-
ing H & R Block is representing, directly or by implication, that it
will reimburse the client, for any tax liability payments required in
addition to the originally computed amount, if there was error on the
part of the firm." In fact, the company pays only the penalty or
interest incurred and not, the additional tax itself; the taxpayer must
pay the deficiency. As a result, an unexpected burden is incurred by
the clientele H & R Block typically attracts—those with a low, lim-
ited income." Typically,; these taxpayers pay their taxes or receive
a refund, and do not apportion a sufficient sum to adjust a subsequent
dispute." If there has been a deficiency in the payment, the govern-
a° Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
81 New York Times, July 1, 1971, at 57, col. 2.
82 See, Proposed FTC complaint, In re H & R Block, Inc., File No. 712 3433, 11 5A6
(announced June 30, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Block Proposed Complaint] ; see also,
Taxes: The Little Man's Friend, Newsweek, Feb. +10, 1969, at 72.
38 The FTC complaint states that H & R Block's advertisements may be interpreted
as meaning that:
Respondent will reimburse the taxpayer for any payments the taxpayer may be
required to make in addition to his initial tax payment, if such additional pay-
ment results from an error made by respondent and its representatives in the
preparation of the tax return.
But the complaint indicates that:
Respondent and its representatives [in truth and in fact] do not reimburse the
taxpayer for all payments he is required to make in addition to his initial tax
payment if such additional payment results from an error made by respondent
and its representatives in the preparation of the tax return.
Block Proposed Complaint, supra note 32, at 11 7.
84 Most of these taxpayers are in the $5,000 to $15,000 bracket. Taxes: The Little
Man's Friend, Newsweek, Feb. 10, 1969, at 71.
26 "Mt is one thing, in these days of high taxation, to pay a tax which is foreseen
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ment will usually assess a penalty against the taxpayer at five percent
of the balance due" and interest may accumulate at the rate of six
percent" of the balance. It is at this point that the shocked taxpayer
fully realizes that H & R Block has agreed to pay only approximately
eleven percent of the client's unexpected liability.
The central issue of the FTC's deceptive advertising allegation
is not whether H & R Block advertised an express promise to pay the
additional tax, but whether the average taxpayer, seeing and reading
the claims, could reasonably believe that H & R Block would pay
the difference between the taxpayer's tax liability as erroneously com-
puted by the company and the total amount, including principal and
interest, demanded by the government. It is well established that ad-
vertising need not be literally false to be restricted from dissemina-
tion." Capacity to deceive and not actual deception" is the criterion
by which advertising practices are judged under the Federal Trade
Commission Act." In P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC,41 the Fourth Circuit
upheld a cease and desist order issued by the FTC against the plain-
tiff, notwithstanding the fact that the advertisement involved had con-
tained nothing but truthful statements. The dispute had arisen when
Lorillard claimed that a study commissioned by Reader's Digest re-
vealed that Lorillard's product, Old Gold Cigarettes, was lowest in
tars and nicotine of all brands tested. However, the true import of the
article was that one brand of cigarette was the same as any other so
and provided for, but quite another thing to be faced retroactively, when times have
changed, with a large unexpected interest-bearing tax burden resulting from a transaction
occurring years before that was unnecessary or was not worth the tax cost." S. Surrey
& W. Warren, Cases and Materials on Federal Income Taxation 71 (1962).
Ba The Internal Revenue Code provides that "[i]f any part of any underpayment
. . . is due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations (but without
intent to defraud), there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 5 percent of the
underpayment." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6653(a). In addition, a 50% penalty is im-
posed where fraud is involved. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6653(b).
37 Mt. Rev. Cade of 1954, § 6601(a).
88 FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1963).
89 One commentator has stated that:
The general public has been defined as "What vast multitude which includes
the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do
not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general im-
pressions." The average purchaser has been variously characterized as not "straight
thinking," and subject to "impressions," uneducated, and grossly uninformed; he
is influenced by prejudice and superstition; and he wishfully believes in miracles,
allegedly the result of progress in science.
The ordinary purchaser is not conversant with the technical cant of the
sciences, and he is untrained in the law. Therefore . . . for example . . . [t]he
court must only determine whether the public believes that a soap containing
tone substance] is better than a soap containing [another substance]. One who
subscribes to a book-purchasing plan is ordinarily not qualified to determine the
legal rights and benefits of an offer ... .
Cal'man, Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies § 19,2(a)(1) (3d ed. 1967).
40 317 F.2d at 674-75, applying Federal Trade Commission Act § 55(a), 15 U.S.C.
55(a) (1970).
41 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).
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far as tar and nicotine content were concerned, and that any differ-
ences were minimal." The court found that plaintiff's usage of the
study results was a "perversion" which would lead a reader to con-
clude the antithesis of the Digest's findings." The court concluded that
in determining whether advertising is false or misleading regard must
be given not to "fine spun distinctions" but to the net impression which
the claim can be expected to have on the public."
In so holding, the Lorillard court relied on the decision in Charles
of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC," which had held that there
are occasions when the FTC may require total truthfulness in order
to protect those who are no more than "fools."" Both Ritz and a sub-
sequent case, Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC,4' involved advertised
claims for cosmetic products. In each case, the court held that the
likelihood of deception was so great that the FTC might reasonably
exact full disclosure in order to protect the most gullible of consumers.
In Ritz the court based its holdings on the fact that women are espe-
cially susceptible to claims regarding beauty creams;" in Ward, the
court found that men were similarly enticed by the claims for tonics
promising increased hair growth," notwithstanding the fact that the
claims would be judged patently false by an analytical reader.
For the same reasons that men and women are particularly sus-
ceptible to the claims of cosmetic manufacturers, taxpayers may be
easily beguiled by the claims of tax preparation companies. The aver-
age taxpayer would probably be inclined to accept at face value any
promises of assistance in paying his taxes. In fact, the entire theme of
H & R Block's commercial messages is that the client can be confident
that accurate service has been provided and that, in the "unlikely"
event an error has been made, the taxpayer is protected. However,
this representation is not completely accurate. Many average readers
would not know the technical meaning of "penalty" and thus would
not realize the restriction which the term places on the advertised
promise: "[w]e will pay that penalty or interest." 5°
FTC complaints are issued for their protective effect: their pur-
pose is to enable the public to rely on representations made in adver-
tisements." For this reason a claim is considered in its entirety and
not in piecemeal fashion." Thus, to abate continued use of the alleged
42 Id. at 57.
45 Id.
" See note 39 supra.
45 143 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944).
45 Id. at 680.
47 276 F.2d 953 (2d Cir, 1960).
45 143 F.2d at 680.
4° 276 F.2d at 954.
50 Block Proposed Complaint, supra note 32, at If 5A3. See also, text at notes 33-38
supra.
51 Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 593 (9th Cir. 1957).
Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
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misleading claim, the proposed FTC complaint asks that H & R Block
be ordered to cease and desist from:
1. Using any guarantee without clearly and conspicuously
disclosing the terms, conditions and limitations of any
such guarantee; or misrepresenting, in any manner, the
terms and conditions of any guarantee.
2. Representing, directly or by implication, that respondent
will reimburse its customers for any payments the cus-
tomer may be required to make in addition to his initial
tax payment.. .
3. Failing to disclose, clearly and conspicuously, whenever
respondent makes any representation, directly or by im-
plication, as to its responsibility for, or obligation re-
sulting from, errors attributable to respondent in the
preparation of tax returns, that respondent will not reim-
burse the taxpayer for any deficiency payment assessed
against the taxpayer which results from the said errors."
It has been suggested that the allegations of the proposed complaint
against H & R Block are applicable to the industry in general."
Federal regulation of deceptive practices is not limited to the area
of guarantees. It is also concerned with advertised claims by mem-
bers of the industry that taxpayers will be represented in subsequent
disputes with the IRS stemming from the preparation and filing of
tax returns. For example, H & R. Block has represented by advertise-
ment that it will provide assistance to clients whose returns are se-
lected for audit by the IRS." The Treasury Regulations allow the in-
dividual taxpayer to be represented at an initial meeting before the
Audit Division by the person who prepared the return." However, if
the dispute proceeds to the District Director's Office, the taxpayer's
representative must meet specific standards established by the Trea-
sury Department in order to plead the case." This means that, be-
yond the audit level, representation would have to be made by attor-
neys, certified public accountants, or "enrolled agents.""
It is unclear whether H & R. Block is willing so to represent their
clients beyond the audit level. The agency's advertised claim indicates
that a taxpayer could reasonably assume that representation would
53 Block Proposed Complaint, supra note 32, at IO.
" Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
55 Block Proposed Complaint, supra note 32, at 11 5B1. It should be noted that subse-
quent to the publication of the FTC's proposed complaint against Block, that company
now advertises that "if your return is audited we will accompany you, at no extra cost,
to the Internal Revenue Service and explain how your return was prepared, even though
we will not act as your legal representative." Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1972, at 30, col. 2
(emphasis added).
58 Treas. Reg.;; 10.7(a) (7) (1966).
57 Rev. Proc. 68-20, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 813.
58 Rev. Proc. 68-20, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 812 § 3.01.
903
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
be provided until the claim is settled by litigation or compromise."
However, it is doubtful that Block would incur the expense involved
in providing an attorney or certified public accountant as a repre-
sentative. It is similarly doubtful that Block would provide enrolled
accountants. These accountants are highly trained, must pass exam-
inations set by the Treasury Department," and must adhere to the
standards of tax practice applied to attorneys by the various state bars,
and to accountants by state licensing boards.°' Moreover, well-trained
accountants are probably not attracted to the seasonal employment
that tax preparation companies usually offer. In addition, enrolled ac-
countants are precluded from advertising their services, and an asso-
ciation with H & R Block may violate this requirement."
To be sure, H & R Block is not the only allegedly offending tax
preparation service, and the FTC plans to move against another mem-
ber of the industry as well." A proposed complaint against Beneficial
Corporation, a large loan company now involved in computerized tax-
preparation, includes an allegation of misrepresentation in advertis-
ing." Of particular concern to the FTC is Beneficial's promotional
material which promises an "instant refund" of money due the tax-
payer from the government, if the taxpayer qualifies for a personal
loan with the company. If, based on Beneficial's preparation of a
client's tax return, the company determines that the taxpayer is en-
titled to a refund, Beneficial will pay that amount to the client,
ostensibly to avoid the delay in waiting for the government's refund
check." However, the Commission has alleged in its complaint that
the "instant refund" is not a refund at all, but is in reality a personal
loan for which the taxpayer is required to pay a finance charge and
other costs."
Extensive use of various advertising techniques has generated
56 One such claim states that Block "will appear with you at an audit without cost
to you." Block Proposed Complaint, supra note 32, at § 5B1.
60 Treas. Reg. § 10.4(a) (1966).
51 Treas. Reg. § 10.20-.30 (1966).
62 The Treasury Regulations provide:
No attorney, certified public accountant, or enrolled agent shall solicit em-
ployment, directly or indirectly, in matters related to the Internal Revenue
Service. For the purposes of this section, solicitation includes, but is not limited
to, the advertising of professional attainments or services, the employment of, or
the forming of an association or partnership ... corporation or other organization
which solicits in a manner prohibited to attorneys, certified public accountants,
and enrolled agents by the provision of this part, or the use of signs, printing, or
other written matter . . . .
Treas. Reg. $ 10.30 (1966).
63 See Proposed FTC complaint, In re Beneficial Corp., File No. 712 3580 (announced
June 30, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Beneficial Proposed Complaint].
64 Id. at g 6.
65 "The instant you sign your return and qualify for an on-the-spot Ioan, Beneficial
advances you the full amount of your refund. So there's no waiting all those weeks and
weeks for your check from the government." Id. at g 5(1) (b).
66 Id. at 11 7.1.
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much of the clientele for tax preparation services. In completing re-
turns for these people, the industry performs a public service by of-
fering inexpensive methods of providing tax advice. However, these
companies should not be given an unrestricted license to continue
their questionable advertising practices. Unfortunately, the FTC does
not have the personnel or resources to supervise these practices on a
daily basis." Furthermore, the scope of the Commission's activities
is restricted—i.e., a complaint issued by the FTC applies only to the
particular firm involved and does not constitute a mandate against in-
dustry-wide practices. 68 Even after the FTC decides to move against
a firm, the action may not be resolved for several years, especially
when the defendant utilizes the full scope of available appellate pro-
cedures.° Therefore, direct control of the tax preparation industry's
advertising practices by the Treasury Department may be more ef-
fective.
This control could be effected pursuant to the licensing powers
that S. 1527 would grant to the Treasury Department. The threat of
license revocation for deceptive advertising practices would, in effect,
create a procedure for enforcement of truth-in-advertising within the
industry. Furthermore, standards promulgated pursuant to the Trea-
sury Department's regulatory power under S. 1527 could regulate
directly the advertising of guarantees in the tax preparation field, and
they could be specifically tailored to require freedom from ambiguity."
IV. MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Beneficial entered the tax preparation industry with the intention
of using information obtained from clients for the purpose of promot-
ing the sale of various financial services." Personal data obtained in
67 "In 1967 the FTC received an appropriation of $14,378,000; of this amount,
$6,846,000 was allocated to stopping deceptive practices. This latter figure is Iess than the
combined television advertising budget for Anacin and Bayer during the first quarter of
1968." Travers, Foreword to Deceptive Advertising Symposium, 17 Kan. L. Rev. 551, 556
(1969). "It has been pointed out that Procter and Gamble spent $24 million merely to
introduce 'Bold,' yet another washday miracle." This amount is almost twice as much as
the $14 million the federal government spends annually to operate the FTC. Morse, A
Consumer's View of FTC Regulation of Advertising, 17 Kan. L. Rev. 639, 644 (1969).
Under such conditions, it is folly to expect the FTC to counteract deceptive practices.
08 See Comment, Deceptive Advertising, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1005, 1063-96 (1967), and
Travers, supra note 65, at 556-57.
OD "Lacking preliminary injunctive powers except in the case of false food and drug
advertisements ... the FTC is impotent to prevent deceptive practices until after trial
and administrative appeals." Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal
Trade Commission, 17 Kan. L. Rev. 559, 560 (1969). See also, Comment, supra note 66,
at 1063-96. Illustrative of the time-consuming, review procedures which impede the en-
forcement of FTC orders is Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959).
In that case, it took the Commission 16 years to enforce a cease and desist order.
70 This may be the better solution, particularly since the common law remedies in
contract and tort are recognized as being ineffective to meet this problem. See Comment,
supra note 68, at 1016-17.
71 See Business Week, Dec. 20, 1969, at 80:
The refund ploy is, of course, expected to generate a large chunk of tax prepara-
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the course of preparing clients' tax returns provided Beneficial with
the knowledge and opportunity subsequently to approach these tax-
payers with loan offers. As a result of this practice, the FTC has al-
leged in its complaint that Beneficial preys on the taxpayer's trust by
determining a client's financial status in order to sell him a wide vari-
ety of financial services.
H & R Block developed a similar plan to sell insurance to its
customers in partnership with the Pennsylvania Life Insurance Com-
pany of North America." As in its complaint against Beneficial,"
the FTC has alleged that Block has breached the trust of its clients
by using tax information to form lists of names which are segregated
according to income brackets. The FTC further alleged that Block
uses this list to formulate its own sales programs and then sells the
lists to other companies for similar uses." This practice, alleges the
FTC, is contrary to the representations made to the taxpayer that the
relationship between the client and the firm is a confidential one."
In addition, when an individual or firm is engaged to prepare the
income tax return of another, an agency relationship arises." The
agent-preparer is then burdened with fiduciary responsibilities. He
must act only for the benefit of his principal and, therefore, may not
use to the detriment of his principal information acquired in the
course of the agency relationship.
In Chalupiak v. Stahlman," the defendant-agent was employed
by the plaintiff to draw up a deed of sale for land which the latter
mistakenly believed he owned. However, the defendant had knowledge
that his principal did not have title to the land, and, subsequently
bought this property on behalf of his sister. Notwithstanding the fact
that the agent had suggested to his principal that title to the land might
tion business, but it is really a "kicker" to entice people to come in and sign up
for a wide range of "family financial services"—espedally mutual funds and life
insurance—that Benevest's salesmen will peddle after the tax season closes.
Id.
72 Id. H	 R Block discontinued its relationship with Pennsylvania Life Insurance
Company in January, 1971. A consent order provisionally accepted by Block and the FTC
prohibits Block's use of confidential information without the client's prior consent. FTC
News Summary No. 1 (1972).
73 The Beneficial Proposed Complaint states: "Respondents . . . retain a copy of
each income tax return prepared by them and a copy of a financial profile which is filled
out for each customer on the basis of information provided by the customer ostensibly
for the respondent's use in the preparation of the customer's tax return." Beneficial Pro-
posed Complaint, supra note 63, at If 8.
74 Id.
75 Block Proposed Complaint, supra note 32, at 11 9; and Beneficial Proposed Com-
plaint, supra note 63, at 11 9.
76 "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf...." Restatement (Second)
of Agency 1(1) (1957).
77 368 Pa. 83, 81 A.2d 577 (1951). For differing interpretations of this case, see
Note, Agency—Principal and Agent or Master and Servant, 56 Dick. L. Rev. 357 (1952),
and Note, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 448 (1951).
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be vested in the county commissioners, the court ordered the agent
to convey the adverse title to the plaintiff. The court reasoned that
the agent owed a duty of fidelity to the plaintiff which he violated
by the subsequent purchase of the land. Analogously, when an income
tax preparation agency' elicits financial information from its clients, it
acts as a fiduciary. Any information provided by the client in the
course of this relationship should not be used to the agent's advan-
tage or the principal's disadvantage.
To curb existing practices which breach fiduciary obligations,
legislation has been introduced by Senator Mathias" and Represen-
tative Gallagher" which would greatly circumscribe the purposes for
which tax preparation firms may use their client's personal informa-
tion absent a written release. In pertinent part, this legislation pro-
vides:
Any person who receives any information furnished by
a taxpayer to enable such person to prepare or have pre-
pared for such taxpayer a return of the tax imposed by
chapter 1 or a declaration of estimated tax required by sec-
tion 6015 and who---
(1) uses any such information for any purpose
other than the preparation of the return or dec-
laration, or makes any such information available
to any other person for any such purpose, unless
a valid consent . . . to so use such information, or
to so make such information available, has been
obtained, or
(2) uses any such information, or makes any such
information available for a purpose not specified
in such valid consent,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution.8°
It is submitted that the legislation's proposed imposition of crim-
inal sanctions to enforce this program will stultify the efficacy of the
proposal. Requirements of proof and crowded court calendars will
undoubtedly impede the effective court enforcement of the regulations
in Senator Mathias' bill. A more practicable approach would be to
incorporate the proposed requirement of a client's signed release into
the standards proposed by Senator Ribicoff in S. 1527, and to allow for
administrative enforcement of the measure. In this way, the ultimate
sanction of revocation of the agent's license and intermediate penalties
or fines could be imposed, thereby providing a more efficient and prob-
78 S. 1387, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
78 H.R. 6478, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
88 S. 1387, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(e) (1971).
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ably more effective manner of enforcement. Under such a procedure,
both the time-consuming requirement of awaiting judicial adjudication
of the dispute and delayed consumer relief are avoided.
Notwithstanding the apparent incompetence and bad faith demon-
strated by members of the tax preparation industry, an important
practical consideration must be kept in mind by those who pass legis-
lation or promulgate regulations to curb the aforementioned abuses.
Use of taxpayer information to sell insurance or loans or similar pro-
grams has provided the industry with an added source of revenue.
Although actual data is not available, it seems reasonable to assume
that this added revenue has accounted in large measure for the indus-
try's ability to keep the cost of tax preparation services relatively low.
This low cost enables low-income individuals, unsophisticated in even
the simplest tax matters, to afford assistance in the preparation of their
returns. What is suggested, then, is not that the industry's deceptions
or poor quality be overlooked; rather, it is hoped that the needed legis-
lation and regulations will correct those failures without being overly
oppressive, so that costs can remain sufficiently low to appeal to lower-
income taxpayers. For this reason, it is submitted that the industry
should be required to employ competent personnel with some sophisti-
cation in tax matters, but not necessarily high-priced accountants or
attorneys; and that tax service agencies should be required to obtain
their clients' permission before disseminating confidential information,
but not be precluded absolutely from engaging in such a practice.*
CONCLUSION
The questionable competence of tax preparers and industry solici-
tation practices suggest a need to protect taxpayers who enlist the
services of tax preparation firms. Because of the severe penalties im-
posed for the filing of faulty returns, these taxpayers need protection
from incompetent advice and service, and misleading advertising prac-
* On December 10, 1971, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-178, 85 Stat. 529. Section 316 of the Act adds § 7216 to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Section 7216 provides, in relevant part:
(a) GENERAL Rum.—Any person who is engaged in the business of preparing,
or providing services in connection with the preparation of, returns of the tax
imposed by chapter 1, or declarations or amended declarations of estimated tax
under section 6015, or any person who for compensation prepares any such
return or declaration for any other person, and who—
(1) discloses any information furnished to him for, or in connection with,
the preparation of any such return or declaration, or
(2) uses any such information for any purpose other than to prepare, or
assist in preparing, any such return or declaration, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 81,000, or
imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
It is submitted that the consent procedure provided for in S. 1387, the Mathias
bill, is a more practicable approach. Under S. 1387 the preparer would not be deprived of
the added sources of revenue described in the text, provided that he makes full disclosure
to clients of the uses to which he will put the confidential information and obtains their
"valid consent." See subsection (1) of the Mathias bill in the text at note 80 supra.
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tices. Recourse to the courts is available; however, for taxpayers
whose income and tax liability is minimal, the adjudicatory cure is
worse than the disease. In addition, effective remedial action by the
FTC seems doubtful in light of that agency's budgetary and proce-
dural restrictions. Thus effective regulation of the tax preparation
industry seems to be a necessity. However, in promulgating such
regulations, Congress and the administrative agencies should take care
not to place standards so high that the cost of industry compliance
would place preparation fees beyond the pocketbook of the average
taxpayer. To this end, Senator Ribicoff's proposed legislation, S. 1527,
suggests a basic framework within which effective controls may be
structured. A federal licensing system, accompanied by standards
designed to safeguard the rights of clients, offers a viable alternative to
existing practices in the industry.
PATRICIA A. RYAN
909
